Reforms and Counter-Reforms in the Italian Struggle for an Accusatorial Criminal Law System by Panzavolta, Michele
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 30 | Number 3 Article 2
Spring 2005
Reforms and Counter-Reforms in the Italian
Struggle for an Accusatorial Criminal Law System
Michele Panzavolta
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michele Panzavolta, Reforms and Counter-Reforms in the Italian Struggle for an Accusatorial Criminal Law System, 30 N.C. J. Int'l L. &
Com. Reg. 577 (2004).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol30/iss3/2
Reforms and Counter-Reforms in the Italian Struggle for an Accusatorial
Criminal Law System
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This article is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol30/iss3/2
Reforms and Counter-Reforms in the Italian Struggle
for an Accusatorial Criminal Law System
Michele Panzavoltat
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................................................... 578
II. The Code of 1988: The Fruit of a New Ideology ................. 578
A. The Italian Inquisitorial Tradition: The Code of 1930..579
B. Inquisitorial, Accusatorial, and Adversarial ................... 582
C. The 1988 Reforms: Breaking with the Past ................... 583
D. The Accusatorial Discipline of the 1988 Code: The
"Double-Dossier" System .............................................. 586
E. Coexistence of Accusatorial and Inquisitorial
Features in the New System ........................................... 591
F. Making an Accusatorial System Sustainable Through
Trial A lternatives ........................................................... 593
III. The 1992-1997 Counter-Reform .......................................... 596
A. The 1992 Decisions by the Constitutional Court ........... 596
B. The 1992 Novel and the Full Return of the
Inquisitorial System ....................................................... 599
C. The 1998 Show-Down ................................................... 601
IV. Factors Contributing to the Accusatorial System's Failure. 602
A. An Inquisitorial Constitution? ...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603
B. Cultural Factors: The Search for "Material" Truth ........ 604
C. Contradictions in the Legislature's Plan of 1988 ........... 605
D. Judicial Organization: The Common Background of
Prosecutors and Judges .................................................. 606
E. The Professional Status of Judges .................................. 608
F . R efl ections ...................................................................... 609
V. The Re-Establishment of the Accusatorial Choice .............. 610
A. The 1999 Constitutional Reform .................................... 610
t Ph. D. student, University of Urbino. I would like to thank Professor Giulio Illuminati
(University of Bologna) for his careful remarks and enlightening comments. I also
would like to thank Professor Michael Corrado and the Editorial Board of the North
Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation for the outstanding job
done in reviewing and editing this article.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
B. The Reform Following the Enactment of the
Constitutional Reform .................................................... 611
C. The Constitutional Court's Assent to the New
P rovisions ....................................................................... 6 15
D. Present Disputes Within the Accusatorial System ......... 616
E. Is the Accusatorial System Sustainable? A Difficult
Harmonization with Efficiency and the Resurrection
of Inquisitorial Procedures Within the Accusatorial
S ystem ............................................................................ 6 18
V I. C onclusion ............................................................................ 622
I. Introduction
In 1988, Italy adopted a new code of criminal procedure (the
Code) that scholars heralded as "revolutionary."' The new Code
marks a clear departure from Italy's inquisitorial civil law tradition
and a decisive move towards an adversarial model of criminal
procedure. Although the Code is less than twenty years old, it has
undergone many changes since its enactment.3 The odyssey of the
Code represents the struggle for the written laws to become the
laws in practice. The Code's story cannot be viewed only as a
dispute between different criminal procedure ideologies, but also
as an example of the notion that in order for laws to work as they
are intended, a certain amount of acceptance is needed from those
who must apply them.
II. The Code of 1988: The Fruit of a New Ideology
The 1988 Code marks a clear departure from Italy's prior
inquisitorial tradition.4 To appreciate the magnitude of the change,
a brief explanation of the historical antecedents to the 1988 Code
is necessary.
1 William T. Pizzi & M. Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial
System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L., 429, 429 (2004); Ennio Amodio & Eugenio
Selvaggi, An Accusatorial System in a Civil Law Country: The 1988 Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 1211, 1211 (1989).
2 Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note 1, at 1212 (stating that "the 1988 Italian Code
stands out as a historical turning point in the headway towards the adversary system").
3 Parliament has enacted over forty reform bills since the new Code has come into
force. Some bills made small adjustments, others brought major changes; the overall
outcome is that of a code in constant transition. See, e.g., supra Part V.
4 Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note 1, at 1211.
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A. The Italian Inquisitorial Tradition: The Code of 1930
The 1988 Code replaced the 1930 Code.5 The 1930 Code
codified the main features of the codes of 1865 and 1913.6 Under
the 1930 Code, the criminal process was split into two distinct
phases.7 The first phase focused on the investigation of the crime
while the second phase focused on the public trial.8
The investigating judge dominated the first phase, while the
prosecutor served an auxiliary role to the judge. 9 It was the
investigating judge's duty to oversee the collection of evidence.10
The judge could hear the testimony of witnesses, conduct searches
and seizures, and gather documentary evidence." The
investigating judge could also summon and question the accused. 12
All information gathered by the investigating judge was then
recorded in an investigative dossier.13
Defense attorneys played only a minor role in the judge's
investigation. Under the original 1930 Code, defense counsel
could not participate in the investigative procedures conducted by
the judge, including the questioning of the accused.14 Later
5 The new Code was enacted by Delegated Decree n. 447 of Sep. 22, 1988
(published in Gazz. Uff., No. 250 (Oct. 24, 1988)).
6 See FRANCO CORDERO, PROCEDURA PENALE 78-89 (6th ed. 2001). All three
codes suffered the influence of the French model; the Napoleonic codification inspired
them directly. See infra note 42.
7 See Louis F. Del Duca, An Historical Convergence of Civil and Common Law
Systems - Italy's New "Adversarial" Criminal Procedure System, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L.
75-81 (1991); William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law
Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1992).
8 Id.
9 These were the roles assumed in the "formal instruction" phase, the ordinary
way of investigating a crime. See Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note 1, at 1214-16. If the
crime was evident, though, and there was little need for an investigation, "summary
instruction" was conducted by the prosecutor alone. Id.
10 "The investigating judge has the duty to discharge promptly all, and only, those
acts that appear necessary to the ascertainment of the truth in the light of the collected
elements." CODICE Dl PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] art. 299 (1930) (Italy); see Delfino
Siracusano, Istruzione, in XXIII ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTo 177 (1973).
11 C.P.p. arts. 332, 337, 312 (1930).
12 Id. arts. 365, 366, 367 (1930).
13 Id. arts. 302, 336, 320 (1930).
14 No provision required the investigating judge to inform the defense counsel that
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reforms 5 and a series of decisions by the Constitutional Court 6
allowed some participation by the defendant's attorney in the
investigation and allowed the defense attorney to challenge the
investigating judge's activity in certain situations. 7  The
investigative phase ended with the judge's decision to either
formally charge or acquit the accused.'
8
The second phase of the criminal process under the 1930 Code
was a public trial.' 9 Under the 1930 Code, the defendant had some
opportunities to refute the prosecution's theory of guilt at trial.2°
During opening and closing arguments, the defense could present
an assessment of the facts to counter the prosecution's theory.2'
The defense could also present evidence to support their position.22
Nevertheless, counsel was not allowed to cross-examine the
witnesses.23 Instead, the parties could each pose their questions to
the witnesses through the judge who would formally conduct the
direct and cross-examination.24
the investigation was being performed and no right of participation was guaranteed in the
Code either.
15 See, e.g., Law n. 517 of June 18, 1955 (published in Gazz. Uff., No. 148 (June
30, 1955)), Decree-Law n. 2 of 1971 (published in Gazz. Uff., No. 18 (Jan. 23, 1971)),
converted in Law n. 62 of Mar. 18, 1971 (published in Gazz. Uff., No. 72 (Mar. 23,
1971)), Law n. 773 of Dec. 15, 1972 (published in Gazz. Uff., No. 236 (Dec. 18 1972)).
16 Corte cost., 1970, n.190, Giur. Cost. 2176 (1970); Corte cost., 1972, n.63, Giur.
Cost. 282 (1972); Corte cost., 1972, n.64, Giur. Cost. 313 (1972).
17 C.P.P. art. 304 bis (1930). This article permitted the attorney to participate in the
questioning of the accused, judicial experiments and other technical ascertainments, and
local searches. Id. The provision also allowed the attorney to express any observation,
disagreement, or question he wished. Id. Even after the reform of Article 304, however,
the defense was not allowed to take part in the questioning of the witnesses,
confrontations between witnesses, and personal searches. See CORDERO, supra note 6, at
88.
18 Acquittals would occur because of the absence or insufficiency of the evidence,
because the accused could not be punished for certain reasons (e.g., mental illness),
because the relevant criminal provision had been abolished or declared unconstitutional,
or because of statutes of limitation (prescrizione). C.P.P. arts. 479, 152, 378 (1930).
19 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 3-4.
20 Some scholars in fact considered it an accusatorial trial. OTrORINO VANNINI ET
AL., MANUALE DI DIRITTO PROCESSUALE ITALIANO 441 (1986).
21 C.P.P. arts. 438, 468 (1930).
22 Id. art. 415.
23 Id. art. 448.
24 Id. art. 467.
REFORMS AND COUNTER-REFORMS
Although the defendant had some opportunities to rebut the
prosecution's theory of guilt, the trial often did little more than
serve as a repetition of the investigative phase. Under the 1930
Code, the prosecution could, without restriction, read the
investigative dossier compiled during the investigative phase at
trial.25 The investigations were conducted within a short time after
the commission of a crime, whereas trials took place long after the
alleged. Thus, the findings of the investigation were naturally
given more weight than the facts presented at trial, thereby making
the investigative dossier the crucial factor in determining guilt.
The judge would read the investigative dossier just after the trial
was formally opened.26 The fact that records had been unilaterally
collected by the investigating judge without any opportunity for
the defense to object was irrelevant.27 Under the 1930 Code, a
trial was essentially a formal exercise used to legitimize the
judge's investigation and subsequent decision to charge the
defendant based on that investigation.28
25 Id. arts. 463, 464, 465, 467; see GILBERTO LoZZI, LEZIONI DI PROCEDURA PENALE
8 (6th ed. 2004).
26 Delfino Siracusano, II nuovo codice di procedura penale: realta e prospettive, in
LE NUOVE DISPOSIZIONI SUL PROCESSO PENALE 15 (Cedam ed., 1989).
27 Id.
28 See Paolo Ferrua, La formazione delle prove nel nuovo dibattimento: limiti
all'oralitb e al conmtraddittorio, in STUDI SUL PROCESSO PENALE 79 (1990).
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B. Inquisitorial, Accusatorial, and Adversarial9
This Article takes the position that an accusatorial system of
criminal procedure allows a judge to make decisions based only on
evidence collected in oral form (the principle of orality), in his
presence (the principle of immediacy),3 ° in a public trial
containing adversarial dynamics.3 In other words, an accusatorial
system clearly separates the investigation and trial stages.32 In an
inquisitorial system, the judge's decisions are based on evidence,
regardless of whether it was collected in oral form.3 3 Inquisitorial
29 One historical distinction between inquisitorial and accusatorial systems of
procedure is the identity of the accuser. In an inquisitorial system, a public officer
pressed charges against a defendant, whereas in an accusatorial system, a private citizen
pressed charges against the defendant. MInAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND
STATE AUTHORrrY 3 (1986). This distinction is obsolete in the modem era, as most
countries have centralized the duty of prosecution to the state. Giulio Illuminati,
Accusatorio e inquisitorio (sistema), in ENCICLOPEDIA GIURnICA I (Treccani ed., 1988).
Another historical distinction between inquisitorial and accusatorial systems of
criminal procedure is the role of judges and prosecutors. Inquisitorial systems did not
distinguish between the roles of judge and prosecutor. DAMASKA, supra, at 3. This
distinction between the two systems is also now obsolete. In most countries, especially
those in the West, the judge and prosecutor serve two distinct functions. Illuminati,
supra, at 1.
Some scholars believe that the distinction between the two systems lies in the
differences between common law and civil law jurisdictions. Kai Ambos, International
Criminal Procedure: "Adversarial, " "Inquisitorial," or Mixed?, 3 INT'L CRIM. L. REV.
5, 5 (2003). This position, however, does not explain the distinction between
inquisitorial and accusatorial systems. Instead, it merely reframes the question to instead
ask which traits distinguish the common law from civil law jurisdictions. See Raneta
Lawson Mack, It's broke so let's fix it: using a quasi-inquisitorial approach to limit the
impact of bias in the American Criminal Justice System, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
70-71; CORDERO, supra note 6, at 25 (observing that the accused is in particular
considered a determinant source: all the precious information he owns should be
extracted from him). Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function: The
Search for Truth and the Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Justice
Systems, 12 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 218 (2002) (inquisitorial systems "seek the truth at all
costs").
30 Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM.
J. COMP. L. 228, 243 (2000) (stating the principle of immediacy encompasses the notion
that the judge who receives evidence in court is the same judge who decides the case
upon its merits).
31 Ferrua, supra note 28, at 80.
32 Illuminati, supra note 29, at 1.
33 Id. at 2.
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systems permit the inclusion of any evidence collected, even if the
evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant's or
witnesses' rights.34 Mixed procedure systems are those that
provide for an adversarial trial but still allow the judge to make a
decision based on evidence collected unilaterally by the judge or
prosecutor during the investigative phase.35 In this sense, mixed
procedure is essentially inquisitorial.
This Article intends the term adversarial to mean a procedure
that depends on the parties' initiatives.36 While accusatorial
implies adversarial, the opposite is not necessarily true. A trial
could theoretically be fully adversarial, or initiated by the parties,
but still allow the introduction of out of court evidence. For a trial
to be considered accusatorial, it must be adversarial, but it must
also use the doctrine of hearsay to exclude unreliable evidence.37
According to these definitions, the original Italian Code of
1930 was an inquisitorial system of law that was later modified to
become a mixed system.38 Under the 1930 Code, a judge was the
finder of fact and at the same time had broad powers to introduce
evidence.39 In addition, a judge could base a decision on evidence
collected unilaterally during the investigation.4°
C. The 1988 Reforms: Breaking with the Past
The 1930 Code was based on the premise that all evidence
should be available to a judge, regardless of how it was collected;
no limit should be placed on the search for the truth.41 Truth
34 Id.
35 Id. at 2-3; LuIGI FERRAJOLI, D1RrrrO E RAGIONE. TEORIA DEL GARANTISMO
PENALE 578 (6th ed. 2000). The mixed type of procedure originated in the Napoleonic
era with the French Code d'instruction criminelle, issued in 1808. See CORDERO, supra
note 6, at 64-67. The model soon spread throughout Europe with Napoleon's conquests.
Id. PAOLO FERRUA, ORALITA DEL GIuDIzIo E LETTURE Di DEPOSIZIONI TESTIMONALI 62-
66(1981).
36 Grande, supra note 30, at 249.
37 Id.
38 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that the 1930 Code envisioned a
mixed system); Ennio Amodio, Un questionario sul nuovo processo penale, in
DEMOCRAZIA E DIRiTTO 67 (1976).
39 See supra Part II.A.
40 Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note 1, at 1216.
41 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 7.
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necessitated unlimited freedom to search.42 This rationale was
explained by the following metaphor: "The judge is a croupier.
He takes all the chips bet on the table. 43
The drafters of the 1988 Code, however, were driven by an
opposite belief. The new Code is based on the premise that the
probative value of evidence is affected by the manner in which it
is collected." In order for evidence to be given full probative
value at trial, it must be collected according to certain rules.45 The
drafters believed the best method for developing evidence and
discovering truth was a context in which opposing viewpoints are
present.46
Since truth was to be discovered in the investigation process,
the 1930 Code required that the investigator be impartial.47 Thus,
both the investigative and the trial stages were entrusted to
subjects presumed impartial, the investigating judge and the trial
judge.48 Because of their dual role, judges were given broad
powers to introduce all evidence necessary to solve the case.49
42 FRANCESCO CARNELuTT, LA PROVA CIVILE 28-32 (1992). This does not mean
that the 1930 Code permitted violation of people's rights (such as the use of torture or
similar coercive means) in order to obtain truth. However, even if limited by the respect
of human rights, the ideology of "truth with all possible means" still animated the 1930
Code. In other words, the evolution of democracy and civil liberties did limit the idea
that the quest for truth necessitated the maximum amount of information possible, but
this conception permeated the 1930 Code. The Code refused to waste any evidence
gathered unless it was gathered by violating human liberties.
43 Glauco Giostra, Indagine e prova: dalla non dispersione a nuovi scenari
cognitivi, in VERSO LA RISCOPERTA DI UN MODELLO PROCESSUALE 47 (2003).
44 Massimo Nobili, Concetto di prova e regime di utilizzazione degli atti nel nuovo
codice di procedura penale, in FORO ITALIANO V 275 (1989); Maximo Langer, From
Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L. J. 9,47 (2004).
45 Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note 1, at 1217.
46 ANIELLO NAPPI, GUIDA AL NUOVO CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE 6, 11 (9th ed.
2004). Moving towards a relative concept of truth, the drafters believed that the "real"
truth affirmed by the previous ideology was obsolete. See Giulio Ubertis, La ricerca
della verita giudiziale, in LA CONOSCENZA DEL FATTO NEL PROCESSO PENALE 2 (G.
Ubertis ed., 1992). Truth is what is proven best for the present; the future may bring
changes resulting in a new and different truth. See id.
47 CORDERO, supra, note 6, at 25.
48 See supra Part II.A.
49 C.P.P. art. 457 (1930).
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The drafters of the 1988 Code approached the issue of
impartiality differently. They believed that no investigation could
be completely impartial; all investigators are affected by their
personal points of view and backgrounds.5 ° Furthermore, they
believed that the act of investigating a crime itself creates bias on
the part of the investigator.5 Because of this potential for
partiality, the drafters of the new Code created a clear separation
between criminal investigations and trials. Under the Code, the
individual parties conduct investigations,52 effectively abolishing
the investigating judge.53
Under the new Code, investigations are conducted by the
prosecutor.5 4 He conducts his inquiry in order to deem whether to
file a formal charge against the defendant or to dismiss the case.
The investigative evidence collected should serve this purpose
alone. The defense can also discharge a preliminary investigation.
Under the original version of the Code such faculty was provided
by a vague and generic norm55. A statute issued in 200056 has
clarifies the investigative powers held by the defense" .
50 See Glauco Giostra, Contraddittorio, in ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA 3 (2001)
(stating that the investigating actor elaborates a hypothesis to seek the truth but ends up
seeking the truth of his hypothesis).
51 Id. GIULIO UBERTIS, FAi-rO E VALORE NEL SISTEMA PROBATORIO PENALE, 34-39
(1979).
52 Grande, supra note 30, at 232-34.
53 The elimination of the investigating judge seem to be a point of convergence in
many different civil-law countries: see Langer, supra note 44, at 27.
54 On the power of the public prosecutor during the preliminary investigations see
Giulio Illuminati, Italy, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN THE EUROPEAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 113-115 (Tom Vander Beken and Michael Kilchling, eds.,
2000). It should be added that the prosecutor's use of the more intrusive powers (e.g.,
wiretapping) control by the judge of the preliminary investigation is mandatory. It his
his duty to assure the respect of judicial and constitutional guarantees throughout the
preliminary investigations. See Enzo Zappali, Le nuove funzioni del giudice nella fase
delle indagini preliminari, in LE NUOVE DISPOSIZIONI SUL PROCESSO PENALE 49 (Cedam,
ed., 1989).
55 C.P.P., provisions for the implementation of the code, art. 38 (1988).
56 Law n. 7 December 2000, n. 397. See also Langer, supra note 44, at 34 note
164.
57 The defence can question witness and record the information gathered. C.P.P.
art. 391 bis, ter (1988). The defence can also request documents to public
administrations (Id. art. 391 quater), enter public and (with a judicial permit) private
places to make measurements, surveys or any other technical ascertainment (Id. 391
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But the results of the investigative efforts displayed by the
parties should be kept outside of court. If the proceedings go on to
trial, the case shall be deemed with the sole evidence produced in
front of the impartial presiding judge.
D. The Accusatorial Discipline of the 1988 Code: The
"Double-Dossier" System
Compared to the 1930 Code, the new Code had a completely
different profile, inspired by the Anglo-American criminal
procedure system.58 There were two main goals of the new code.
First, the prosecution and defense were to be the main players in
the criminal process.5 9 Second, the only evidence on which a
decision can be based was the evidence collected orally at trial.6°
As for the first goal, the Code gives each party the right to
introduce their own evidence at trial, so long as it is relevant and it
does not violate the law.61 The solemn affirmation of this broad
right granted to the parties stands in stark contrast to the old
procedure, and is significant in that it reduces the judge's power to
introduce evidence. This assures that the criminal process will lie
in the hands of the parties, and that the judge's role will essentially
be limited to that of an unbiased spectator.
The heart of the new system is the strict separation of the trial
phase from the investigative one. The "double-dossier system"
sexies, septies, decies).
58 Many scholars write of an "Americanization" of criminal procedures,
particularly in Europe. See, e.g., Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in
Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1991). A 'weaker' version of this Americanization
thesis seems more appropriate because the import of American legal aspects does not
substitute the traditional framework; rather, the new legislative products graft onto the
previous framework, creating a hybrid and unique mix. In fact, the consequence of this
Americanization seems to be a "fragmentation" of the traditional legal cultures. See
Langer, supra note 44, at 4-7, 62-64.
59 Grande, supra note 30, at 244.
60 Id. at 247-49.
61 C.P.P. art. 190 (1988). For a discussion of the parties' right to introduce evidence
as a right protected by the Constitution, see Giuliano Vassalli, Il diritto alla prova nel
processo penale, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRrITO E PROCEDURA PENALE 3 (1968). On the
discipline in the new Code, see Massimo Nobili, II diritto delle prove ed un rinnovato
concetto di prova, in COMMENTO AL NUOVO CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE II 384 (M.
Chiavario ed., 1990); Giulio Ubertis, Prova (in generale), in X DIGESTO DELLE
DISCIPLINE PENALISTICHE 296 (1995).
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(doppio fascicolo) is the mechanism the drafters created to ensure
such separation.62 The system was so named in opposition to the
single investigative dossier that characterized the old system.63 In
the 1930 Code, any record of evidence collected by the
investigating judge was placed into the dossier.6' This dossier was
then brought to trial and had other records of the evidence formed
at trial added to it.65  The drafters of the new Code wanted to
prohibit any use of the prior record at trial.66 They also wanted to
shield the trial judge from the investigative file so that he would
not be biased by the records contained therein. 67 The idea was to
not prejudice the judge's mind at the commencement of trial,
thereby guaranteeing only the evidence produced during the trial
would influence the judge.
The mechanism used by the new Code to prevent the judge
from seeing the investigative dossier is quite simple. During the
preliminary stage of the criminal process, all records of evidence
are collected in an investigative-dossier. 68  At the end of the
investigation, the investigative-dossier is set aside and is available
only to the parties, who can then use it to prepare for trial or to
challenge a witness' credibility during his or her trial testimony.
69
The trial judge will never see the investigative-dossier.7 ° Instead,
the trial judge is given a completely new dossier, the trial-dossier,
to be filled only with the evidence collected during trial.71
62 See Ennio Amodio, L'udienza preliminare nel nuovo processo penale, in
CASSAZIONE PENALE 2176 (1988); Ferrua, supra note 28, at 83; Giulio Illuminati, 11
nuovo dibattimento: l 'assunzione diretta delle prove, FORO ITALIANO 357 (1988).
63 MASSIMO NOBILI, LA NUOVA PROCEDURA PENALE 262 (1989).
64 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
65 C.P.P. arts. 492,495 (1930).
66 Grande, supra note 30, at 237.
67 Id. at 243 (implementing the principle of immediacy); NOBILI, supra note 63, at
280.
68 NOBILI, supra note 63, at 279.
69 Grande, supra note 30, at 243.
70 Id. However, there are a few exceptions to this rule. One occurs when the trial
judge has to decide on the prosecutor's request to keep the accused under restrictions
during the proceedings; another takes place when the parties negotiate the penalty at
trial. C.P.P., provisions for the implementation of the code, art. 139 (1988).
71 In other words, before trial, the investigative-dossier is split into two dossiers:
one is the very 'thin' trial-dossier, the other is the 'thick' dossier containing the findings
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In theory, the trial-dossier should be empty when given to the
presiding judge. However, the Code provides some exceptions
and allows some records to be removed from the investigative-
dossier and placed into the trial-dossier before the beginning of
trial.72 These exceptions include evidence which is objectively
impossible to reproduce in court, evidence which has been
produced by the parties during their confrontation in front of a
judge during the investigation (incidente probatorio) because of a
serious risk of not reproducing it at trial,73 records regarding the
corpus delicti, and records of prior convictions of the accused.74
In other words, the magistrate can select from the investigative-
dossier the few records that the Code allows the judge access to
and place these records in the trial-dossier.
At the end of trial, the trial-dossier should contain only the
records available to the judge as proper grounds for his decision.
of the preliminary investigations of the parties which have not been placed in the trial-
dossier. See Ferrua, supra note 28, at 85. The 'thin' trial-dossier become 'thick' during
trial once each piece of evidence is admitted. Id.
72 The insertion is made by the judge of the preliminary hearing or, in proceedings
for minor crimes, which do not need a preliminary hearing, by the prosecutor. See C.P.P.
arts. 431, 553 (1988). In the first case, at the end of the hearing in which he has filed a
formal charge against the accused or in a hearing appositely called, the judge of the
preliminary hearing decides which records meet the exceptions provided by law and
therefore should be put in the trial-dossier. In the second case, the dossier is formed by
the prosecution before the beginning of the trial. Id.
73 The "incidente probatorio" could be translated as an "incidental assumption of
evidence" during the investigative stage. It is "incidental" because it occurs in a phase,
namely the preliminary investigation, where evidence should not be collected. The
incidente probatorio is the instrument that should provide for the gathering of evidence
when there is a risk of losing such evidence (e.g., the witness might die within a short
time) or a risk of losing genuine information (e.g., the witness might be corrupted or
threatened). See id. art. 392 (1988). It consists of a hearing in front of the judge during
which the parties take the deposition of the witness following the rules applicable at trial.
The incidente probatorio is the device that should 'save' evidence at risk of being lost for
trial. This instrument guarantees the adversary and orality principles of trial and
safeguards the judicial assumption of evidence. Only the principle of immediacy is
broken because the judge presiding at the incidente probatorio hearing is a different
judge than the judge that will preside over trial. The trial judge will later read the files of
the hearing which are placed in the trial-dossier. For a discussion on the incidente
probatorio, see Grande, supra note 30, at 243; Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 12.
For a translated discussion of the incidente probatorio, see STEPHEN C. THAMAN,
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 35-37 (Michael Corrado ed., 2002).
74 C.P.P. art. 431 (1988); Grande, supra note 30, at 243-44.
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The judge may not base his decision on information contained in
the trial-dossier.75 To ensure compliance with this rule, the Code
requires the judge to explain his decision based only on the
evidence contained in the trial-dossier.76
The aforementioned description of the severance of the
dossiers should guarantee that investigative evidence does not
affect the judge's decision at trial. Nevertheless, the Code, when
drafted, contained two additional rules to further ensure that the
judge will be shielded from the investigative record. First, the
parties, particularly the prosecutor, could not take the initiative to
read7 7 any prior statements or other investigative records at trial,
except for those few exceptions specifically provided by law.78
The second rule prohibited police officers from testifying at trial
as to witnesses' statements collected during the investigation.79
These two rules guarantee what has been called the "accusatorial
golden rule:" out-of-court statements may be used only to verify a
witness' veracity; they cannot be used for the truth of the matter
asserted.8° In other words, they could never be proper grounds
upon which a decision may be based.8
Despite these measures, the drafters of the Code feared that a
system that excludes all investigative evidence could be too rigid
and cause inefficiencies. For this reason, they provided some
exceptions to the rule.
75 C.P.P. art. 526 (1988).
76 Id. arts. 546, 192.
77 In the Code, the term "reading" means the substantive use of the record in order
to prove the truth of what it asserts.
78 C.P.P. art. 514 (1988).
79 Id. art. 195/4. It should be pointed out that the Code, except for this particular
situation, did not prohibit hearsay testimony by ordinary witnesses. The investigation is
conducted by the prosecution, but the prosecution can use the police for assistance.
ITALY CONST. art. 109; C.P.P. art. 58 (1988). Questioning of witnesses can be conducted
by the prosecutor or by the police when delegated. C.P.P. arts. 64, 375, 370 (1988). The
police are not permitted to question the accused when in custody and after an arrest. Id.
art. 370 (1988). For a discussion on the relationship between the prosecutor and the
police, see Giulio Illuminati, The Role of the Public Prosecutor in the Italian System, in
TASKS AND POWERS OF THE PROSECUTION SERVICES IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 308-10
(Peter J.P. Tak ed., 2004).
80 Paolo Ferrua, La regola d'oro del processo accusatorio, in IL GIUSTO PROCESSO
TRA CONTRADDITTORIO E DIRITO AL SILENZIO 11 (Kostoris ed., 2002).
81 C.P.P. art. 500/3 (1988).
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One exception allows the parties to read a relevant portion of
the investigative record when it has become absolutely impossible
to otherwise present the evidence due to serious and unforeseen
reasons (e.g., the witness' sudden death).82 This exception is the
result of the frequent backlog in the Italian court system that often
causes trials to take place long after the alleged crime occurred.8 3
Another exception to the rule prohibiting the admission of
investigative evidence at trial relates to prior statements of the
accused. The parties can make substantive use of prior statements
of the accused that were rendered to the prosecutor, not the police,
once the statements are used at trial to discredit the accused. 84
These statements can also be read at trial if the accused does not
attend the trial or exercises his privilege against self-incrimination
once his examination had been requested.85 If there are more than
two defendants in the trial, a severed co-defendant has the duty to
come to trial when summoned but can exercise his privilege
against self-incrimination.86 As the Code was originally drafted,
the severed co-defendant's prior statement to the prosecutor could
be used for substantive purposes only if he failed to show up at the
trial, but not if he attended and exercised his privilege against self-
incrimination. 87 A joint defendant (as opposed to a severed co-
defendant) is simply treated like an individual defendant.88
As can be readily observed, the 1988 Code as drafted did not
allow readings of police collected evidence at trial. The Code,
however, provides an exception to this general rule: if the
statements were collected at the crime scene immediately after the
action occurred, they can be used at trial for substantive purposes
82 C.P.P. art. 512 (1988).
83 See infra notes 293-299 and accompanying text.
84 C.P.P. art. 503/5 (1988).
85 Id. art. 513/1.
86 Id. art. 210. A co-defendant is someone who is charged with a crime connected
with that of others. According to Articles 12 and 371/2, the connection exists when two
individuals have committed the same crime (i.e., accomplices), when they have
committed distinct crimes one in the occasion of the other or one in order to commit the
other, or more generally when the two crimes have common evidence. Id. arts. 12,
371/2.
87 Id. art. 513/2.
88 Id. arts. 208, 210, 513.
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only after they have been used to discredit a witness.89
E. Coexistence of Accusatorial and Inquisitorial Features in
the New System
Despite some significant differences, the 1988 Code did retain
some features of the traditional continental model. It is clear that
while the move to an accusatorial system was necessary, some
features of the traditional system were worth retaining. 90
One such feature is the legality principle, which the drafters
confirmed for commencement of criminal proceedings. According
to this principle, the prosecution is compelled to start the
investigation after a crime has been committed and file the formal
charge if the gathered evidence establishes probable cause.91 The
prosecutor has no discretion in the matter. Mandatory prosecution
is based on the principle that all citizens are equal before the law,
and assures that all defendants will be treated equally regardless of
their personal and social conditions.92
Another feature preserved in the Code is the judge's power to
introduce evidence when he cannot decide the case from the
evidence introduced at trial. In such a situation, the judge may
introduce evidence unilaterally93 or ask the parties to submit
evidence on certain specific issues.94  According to the Code as
drafted, the judge's power could be exercised only at the
89 Id. art. 500/4. The provision seems to correspond to the common law rule of the
admissibility of statements that were classified as "present sense impressions" or
"excited utterances." KEANE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 255 (1996); C. MUELLER
& L. KIRKPRATICK, EVIDENCE 806 (2003).
90 Such intent is clearly demonstrated by the delegating statute for the drafting of
the code, which combines the accusatorial inspiration with some of the features typical
of the traditional system. See art. 2 of Law n. 81 of 16 Feb. 1987 (published in Gazz.
Uff., No. 62 (Mar. 16, 1987)).
91 C.P.P. arts. 125, 429 (1988).
92 See, e.g., Illuminati, supra note 54, at 115. See Corte cost., 1991, 88 in Guir.
Cost. 586 (1991). For studies on the Italian prosecution service, see e.g., ALFREDO
GAITO ET AL., ACCUSA PENALE E RUOLO DEL PUBBLICO MINISTERO passim (Gaito ed.,
1991); GIOVANNI CONSO & VLADIMIRO ZAGREBELSKY, PUBBLICO MINISTERO E ACCUSA
PENALE: FROBLEMI E PROsPETrIVE DI RIFORMA passim (Zanichelli ed., 1979); Oreste
Dominioni, Azione penale, in I DIGESTO DELLE DISCIPLINE PENALISTICHE 403 (1987); E.
Marzaduri, Azione penale, in IV ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA 1 (1996).
93 C.P.P. art. 507 (1988).
94 Id. art. 506.
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conclusion of the parties' case.95 This decision to leave the judge
some power regarding evidence was essentially based on a fear of
apathy of one or more parties.96 For example, a prosecutor who
introduces no evidence at trial could violate the principle of
legality and endanger the citizen's right to non-discriminator
treatment within the criminal justice system. Additionally, a
defense attorney may fail to introduce evidence in favor of his
client, and thereby place the presumption of innocence at risk.97
No attempts to create a jury system were made in the new
Code. Rather, fact-finding remains in the hands of professional
judges. The sole exception is the "court of assise," a hybrid panel
composed of six lay judges and two professional judges. This
body is competent to handle only major crimes, such as murders or
crimes punishable by a penalty of more than twenty-four years
imprisonment.98
Another important feature of the traditional system that
remains is that the judge's decisions must have written
justification.99 This feature first appeared in the 18th century and
has since been confirmed.'t ° The rationale for such a duty is
complex, and exists to ensure judicial accountability.'0 ' It grants
greater control throughout the course of the criminal process
95 Grande, supra note 30, at 245.
96 CORDERO, supra note 6, at 939.
97 For a critical account of this reasoning, see GIULIO ILLUMINATI, LA PRESUNZIONE
D'INNOCENZA DELL'IMPUTATO 188-90 (1979).
98 See C.P.P. art. 5 (1988); Langer, supra note 44, at 18 n. 60, 25 n. 104 (stating in
these hybrid courts, the professional judges are still the most influential decision-
makers).
99 ITALY CONST. art. 111, § 6; C.P.P. art. 546 (1988).
100 The duty for the judge to explain in writing the reasons for the decision he made
was first prescribed in 1760 in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. See Mario Pisani,
Appunti per la storia della motivazione nel processo penale, in Ind. Pen. 317 (1970).
The original goal was to put the judges under greater control from the Executive power.
Ennio Amodio, Motivazione della sentenza penale, in XXVH ENCICLOPEDIA DEL
DIRiTro 187 (1977). It was soon abolished because of the opposition of the barristers.
Id. The duty re-appeared during the French Revolution and has remained in civil law
systems since that time. See Franco Cordero, Stilus curiae (analisi della sentenza
penale), in LA SENTENZA IN EUROPA, 302-03 (Cedam ed., 1988).
101 FRANCESCO MAURO IACOVIELLO, LA MOTIVAZIONE DELLA SENTENZA PENALE E IL
SUO CONTROLLO IN CASSAZIONE 9 (1997).
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because it strengthens the control of the appellate judge. 10 2  In
addition, it increases the democratic aspects of the criminal justice
system by making the reasons for the decision available to every
citizen.' °3 Most of all, the duty of justifying decisions assures that
the decision-making process follows a rational path: if the judge
has to explain why he has decided in favor of one party, this
should force him to make his decisions by using rational
arguments.' 04 The judge must be able to persuade the reader that
the decision made was the best under the given circumstances and
not based on improper biases or resulting from corruption.'o 5
Another persisting traditional feature is the provision granting
broad rights of appeal. 116 Both convictions and acquittals may be
appealed, the former by the defense, the latter by both the defense
and prosecution.0 7 Regardless of whether a decision has been
appealed, it can always be submitted to the Court of Cassation,
which assures that the applicable law has been well interpreted and
guarantees the uniformity of interpretations of the laws.'0 8
F. Making an Accusatorial System Sustainable Through Trial
Alternatives
To get a better understanding of the 1988 Code as a whole, one
needs to understand that accusatorial trials are quite expensive. In
addition to monetary expense, accusatorial trials are time-
consuming, since all of the evidence that a judge can base his
102 Amodio, supra note 100, at 186.
103 IACOVIELLO, supra note 101, at 9.
104 Francesco Mauro lacoviello, Motivazione della sentenza penale (controllo della),
in AGGIORNAMENTO IV ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRIT-TO 750 (2000).
105 There is a vast literature in Italy on the justification of judicial decisions. See,
e.g., Amodio, supra note 100, at 181; lacoviello, supra note 104, at 750; IACOVtELLO,
supra note 101; M. MENNA, LA MOTIVAZIONE DEL GIUDIZIO PENALE passim (Jovene ed.,
2000); MICHELE TARUFFO, LA MOTIVAZIONE DELLA SENTENZA CIVILE passim (1975).
106 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 15.
107 C.P.P. arts. 570, 571 (1988).
108 ITALY CONST. art. 11l, § 7 (stating all sentences and decisions restricting
personal liberty can be appealed to the Court). The Court of Cassation is given the role
of assuring the uniformity of judicial decisions in Royal Decree, No. 12 art. 65 (Jan. 30,
1941). On the role of the Court of Cassation in the Italian legal system, see MICHELE
TARUFFO, IL VERTICE AMBIGUO (I1 Mulino ed., 1991).
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decision on must be presented during the trial.'0 9 In order to make
sure all necessary evidence is admitted, each party has to prepare
in detail before trial. The cost of accusatorial trials is even higher
in Italy because of the large caseload of the Italian courts."° For
an accusatorial system to be sustainable in Italy, all proceedings
cannot go on to trial or the system would implode. The drafters of
the 1988 Code were aware of this risk and, in order to avoid it,
they created various alternative means of resolving criminal
cases. I I'
One of these alternative means of resolving criminal cases is
called the "deal at the request of the parties" (applicazione della
pena su richiesta delle parti) and has some resemblance to the
plea-bargaining conducted in the United States.'12 In this deal, the
defendant's attorney and the prosecutor agree on a penalty for the
defendant."13 The defendant is then accorded a reduction of up to
one third of this penalty." 4 Under the original Code provision, the
reduced penalty bargained for could not be longer than two years
imprisonment." 5  By reaching an agreement on the penalty, the
accused waives his right to trial and to a full judgment." 6
The request of the defendant in the "deal at the request of the
parties," however, does not correspond to the American guilty
plea." '7 The defendant does not admit any culpability, as this
would otherwise defeat the presumption of innocence." 8
109 Giovanni Conso, Problemi di metodo e scelte difondo, in LE NUOVE DISPOSIZIONI
SUL PROCESSO PENALE 174 (Cedam ed., 1989).
110 See infra notes 286-92 and accompanying text.
111 There are also other forms of alternative proceedings that allow the parties to go
directly to trial, shortening the pre-trial phase. They are the giudizio direttissimo and the
giudizio immediato. See C.P.P. arts. 449-52, 453-58 (1988). For a panorama on the
Italian alternative proceedings, see generally Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 18-26.
112 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 21. For an accurate overview of this form of
proceeding (prior to the reform of 1999) see Rachel A. Van Cleave, An Offer You Can't
Refuse? Punishment Without Trial in Italy and the United States: The Search for Truth
and an Efficient Criminal Justice System, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 429-450 (1997).
113 Id. Langer, supra note 44, at 49.
"14 C.P.P. art. 444 (1988).
115 Id.
116 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 23; Langer, supra note 44.
117 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 22-23. Langer, supra note 44.
118 Id. at 23. Under the presumption of innocence, any conviction must have at least
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Therefore, the judge must conduct a quick and minimal review of
the investigative file to ensure that innocence is not clearly
indicated by the records." 9 This is not a full judgment, as would
occur at trial. The judge does not evaluate each piece of evidence;
he only ensures there is some evidence present in order to avoid
the conviction of a clearly innocent person. 20 The judge should
also verify the congruence of the penalty and the nature of the
crime (iura novit curia).121
Another alternative to a trial is the "abbreviated trial" (giudizio
abbreviato). In the original version of the abbreviated trial,1 22 the
defendant and the prosecutor agreed to a judgement on the
investigative file. 123 In other words, both defense and prosecution
waived their rights to trial but not to a judgment.2 4  The
abbreviated trial serves the interests of both parties. The
prosecution obtains a quicker resolution of the case, 125 while the
defendant, on the other hand, receives a reduction in penalty.126 If
the defendant is found guilty, he is sentenced to a penalty reduced
by one-third of the regular sentence.
127
In the "proceeding by penal decree" (procedimento per
decreto), the accused is charged on the records of the
investigative-dossier on a prosecutor's written request.' 2  The
judge's decision is made in camera, without the presence of the
parties. 12  Since the accused is deprived of any chance of being
some probative ground. Id.
119 Id. Pizzi & Marifioti, supra note 7, at 23.
120 C.P.P. art. 444, § 2 (1988), amended by Law n. 479 of Dec. 16, 1999 (published
in Gazz. Uff., No. 296 (Dec. 18, 1999)).
121 Id. The 1999 bill introduced the provision relating to the judge's control on the
congruence of the penalty. An English version of art. 444, § 2 as amended is available in
THAMAN, supra note 73, at 244.
122 For the current version of the abbreviated trial, see infra notes 276-283 and
accompanying text.
123 C.P.. art. 438, § 1 (1988), amended by Law n. 479, art. 27 of Dec. 16, 1999.
124 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 23-24.
125 Id. at 24.
126 Id. at 25.
127 Id.
128 C.p.p. art. 459 § 1 (1988).
129 The Code does not provide for any hearing for this proceeding.
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heard and of introducing evidence, the penalty may be reduced by
up to one-half. 3  This form of proceeding, strongly inquisitorial,
is available only for minor crimes for which the only penalty is a
fine. 3  If the defendant opposes such inquisitorial judgment, he
can oppose the prosecutor's request.' By opposing the request,
the penal decree is canceled and a regular trial will take place, but
the defendant loses the opportunity for a penalty reduction.1
33
These alternative procedures were created to afford an
accusatorial-adversarial choice. The goal of the drafters was to
have no more than 20 percent of all proceedings go to trial.
134
Much reliance was placed on these alternative proceedings in
order to meet this goal.
III.The 1992-1997 Counter-Reform
A. The 1992 Decisions by the Constitutional Court
The 1988 Code became effective on October 24, 1989.' The
drafters believed that from that date forward, substantive
connections with the traditional inquisitorial model would be
severed. The drafters operated under the presumption that fixing
the written laws was sufficient to implement the change. After all,
in civil law systems the law is codified; therefore, the provisions
set forth in the text laws are determinative. 3 6  Yet, even in such
systems, the law as it is practiced differs from the written laws.
The written laws require a certain amount of acceptance from the
governed; otherwise, they will encounter resistance in their
application and other forms of rejections. 137 With this premise in
130 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 21.
131 Id.
132 C.P.P., art. 461 (1988). The motion has to be filed within 15 days. Id.
133 Grande, supra note 30, at 254.
134 NoBILI, supra note 63, at 279; Conso, supra note 109, at 175; Paolo Ferrua, II
ruolo del giudice nel controllo delle indagini e nell 'udienza preliminare, in STUDI SUL
PROCESSO PENALE 73 (Giappichelli ed., 1990) (stating the goal was "a bit exaggerated").
135 Art. I of Delegated Decree n. 447 of Sept. 22, 1988 (published in Gazz. Uff. No.
250 (Oct. 24, 1988)).
136 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 7.
137 Using different terms, we could say that "the internal point of view of the legal
actors" should not be set aside, but taken in high consideration. On the concept of
"internal point of view of the legal actors" (which also includes the "individual
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mind, some early decisions that partly conflict with the new
provisions seemed to result more from the effect of an inertial
attitude to the old rules than specific symptoms of a possible
ideological battle.138
The extent of the controversy, however, soon became clear. In
Italy, any provision of law can be submitted to the Constitutional
Court for review to determine whether this law is consistent with
or in violation of the Constitution. 139 These submissions can be
made in the course of a judicial hearing only when there is doubt
about a provision's validity.4 ° The constitutionality issue can be
raised by either the presiding judge or by parties provided that the
complaint is not considered groundless by the judge."
Prosecutors and judges submitted a large number of provisions of
the new Code to the Constitutional Court. In particular, the
allegations were directed against those rules that supported the
sharp distinction between investigations and trials.
The Constitutional Court agreed with these complaints and
delivered a first blow to the Code in Decision n. 24/1992. Here
the Court invalidated the prohibition against police officers
testifying about statements collected in the investigations.' 142 In the
view of the Court, the provision violated the principle of equality
because it prohibited police officers' hearsay testimony while a
similar ban did not apply to ordinary witnesses. 143 Unfortunately,
the Court failed to see the essential role this provision played in
separating the phases of the criminal process."
disposition" of the legal actors) see Langer, supra note 44. "In each system, the attitude
constitutes an engrained habit of procedural participants - a habit that cannot be altered
overnight in response to the lawgiver's fiat. Prudent reform must therefore include
inertia in their calculations." Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary
Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 845
138 The most common attempt was that of widening the number of investigative
records to place in the trial-dossier. See, e.g., Trib. Roma, 3 apr. 1990, Arafa, Foro It. II
1990, 446.
139 ITALY CONST. art. 134.
140 Art. 23 Law n. 87 of 11 Mar. 1953 (published in Gazz. Uff., No. 62 (14 Mar.
1953)).
141 Id.
142 Corte Cost., 1992, n. 24, Giur. Cost. 114 (1992).
143 Id.
144 Italian scholars reacted with unanimous dissent. See Glauco Giostra, Equivoci
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The orality principle was struck down five months later when
the Court declared two additional provisions in conflict with the
Constitution. Decision n. 254 declared Article 513/2
unconstitutional, thus permitting the admission of out-of-court
statements of a severed co-defendant called to testify in the other
defendant's trial, regardless of whether the severed defendant
chose to exercise his right to remain silent. 4 5 The Court justified
its decision on the ground that it was unreasonable to treat a
severed co-defendant and a joint co-defendant differently.I" If a
joint co-defendant who attended trial but exercised his privilege
against self-incrimination could have his prior statements read, a
severed co-defendant should be treated in the same way. 1
47
The second blow to the orality principle was delivered when
the Court permitted the substantive use of prior statements once
they were invoked by the parties during cross-examination to test
the witness' credibility.1 48  In order to reach this conclusion, the
Court relied on the exception in Article 500/4 that allowed the
substantive use of excited utterances once they had been invoked
to attack the witness' credibility. "' The Court reasoned that if
sulla testimonianza indiretta della polizia giudiziaria e sacrificio del principio di oralit,
in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITrO E PROCEDURA PENALE 1130 (1992); Francesco Peroni, La
testimonianza della polizia giudiziaria al vaglio della Corte costituzionale, in RIVISTA
ITALIANA DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA PENALE 688 (1992).
145 Corte cost., 1992, n. 254, Giur. Cost. 1932 (1992).
146 Id. For background, see supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
147 Fabio Grifantini, Utilizzabilitli in dibattimento degli atti provenienti dalle fasi
anteriori, in LA PROVA NEL DIBATTIMENTO PENALE 160-77 (Paolo Ferrua et al. eds.,
1999).
148 Corte cost., 1992, n. 255, Giur. Cost. 1961 (1992). Scholars strongly opposed
such a solution. See Giuseppe Di Chiara, L'inquisizione come "eterno ritorno ": tecnica
delle contestazioni ed usi dibattimentali delle indagini a seguito della sent. n. 255 del
1992, in FoRo ITALIANO II 2016 (1992); Francesco Mauro Lacoviello, Prova e
accertamento del fatto nel processo penale riformato dalla Corte Costituzionale, in
CASSAZIONE PENALE 2028 (1992); Giulio Illuminati, Principio di oralita e ideologie
della Corte Costituzionale nella motivazione della sent. n. 255 del 1992,
GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE II 1974 (1992). Some, though, agreed with the
Court's ruling, believing that substantive use of prior statements should be possible when
the witness is available and has responded to the trial examination and cross-
examination. See Paolo Tonini, Cade la concezione massimalistica del principio di
immediatezza, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI Dirro E PROCEDURA PENALE 1137 (1992).




these investigative statements could be proper grounds for a
decision, then all investigative statements should be, once used to
attack a witness' credibility in oral examination,"" In other words,
the Court discovered in Article 500/4 a provision that granted
credibility to the witness' prior statements and reasoned that the
rationale of the drafters had to be that all prior statements
contained this same amount of credibility, such that they should be
allowed to be read once used to impeach the witness.
The Court adopted an additional argument in support of this
position. The Court considered all the exceptions to hearsay (arts.
500/4, 503/5, 512, 513/1, and 513/2) and deduced from them a
"principle of non-dispersion of evidence," under which no
available information should be wasted, regardless of how it had
been collected.' In justifying its decision, the Court referred to
the duty of the judge to seek the truth, and that such a duty should
not suffer restrictions or limitations.1
52
B. The 1992 Novel and the Full Return of the Inquisitorial
System
The legislature responded to flow of decisions interpreting the
Code coming from the Constitutional Court. In August of 1992, a
bill was passed that increased the number of exceptions to the rule
against the admissibility of out-of-court evidence.1 3  After the
passage of the bill, the parties could introduce records of other
proceedings at trial'54 as well as decisions made in collateral
cases.' Also, the use of out-of-court statements of witnesses who
had not been present at trial was expanded. 5 6
150 Corte cost., 1992, n. 255, at 1968-69.
151 Corte cost., 1992, n. 255, at 1968. For a criticism of this argument, see Oreste
Dominioni, Oralita, contraddittorio e principio di non dispersione della prova, in IL
GusTo PROCESSO 89 (1998).
152 Corte cost., 1992, n. 255, at 1968.
153 Decree-Law n. 306 of June 8, 1992 (published in Gazz. Uff., No. 133 (Jun. 8,
1992)), converted in Law n. 356 of Aug. 7, 1992 (published in Gazz. Uff., No. 185 (Aug.
7, 1992)).
154 C.P.P. art. 238 (1988), amended by Law n. 356 of Aug. 7, 1992.
155 C.P.P. arts. 238 bis, 511 bis (1988), amended by Law n. 356 of Aug. 7, 1992.
156 C.P.P. arts. 431, 512 (1988), amended by Law n. 356 of Aug. 7, 1992. Note that
not all amendments to the Code by the 1992 Novel were directed at tearing down blocks
of the accusatorial building. Some changes were motivated by the attempt to "soften the
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In defense of the legislature, it is argued that Italy had more
pressing priorities in 1992.117 At that time, the argument goes, the
mafia was in open conflict with the Italian State and the legislature
was forced to introduce the counter-reforms. 5 8 Indeed, 1992 was
a difficult year. Two valorous prosecutors' 9 were brutally
assassinated by the mafia. 160 All the institutions of the Italian State
had to display their firm determination in fighting the mafia.
Rather than being a convincing argument, this confirms how weak
the choice of an accusatorial system actually was. All states have
to face dangerous criminality. The mafia is not more dangerous
than any other form of organized crime. In addition, the mafia
operates not only in Italy but also throughout the world, and is
probably a greater danger to the United States than to Italy.16' The
measure of the strength of a state based on the rule of law is its
ability to respond efficiently to the threat of crime without giving
up the state's values and the rights of its citizens. The idea that
particular forms of organized crime justify a restriction of civil
rights or the concept that some crimes should undergo a different
and fully inquisitorial procedure is simply a denial of the rule of
law.
By the end of the summer of 1992, the accusatorial system of
criminal procedure had been definitively weakened. All that
remained was a confused system, one which permitted a vast use
of the information gathered unilaterally by the prosecutor during
his investigations but, at the same time, did not grant the judge all
the powers for seeking "real truth" as the investigative judge had
under the Code of 1930. The system was a hybrid where the
accusatorial spirit became a thing of the past, but the inquisitorial
focus was not really affirmed. Out of this confusion, a new
decision led to coherence but in an inquisitorial direction.
impact" of the decision of the Constitutional Court. Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 1, at
458. Along these lines, the legislature provided that prior evidence could not be a
sufficient ground for a conviction without corroboration from other pieces of evidence.
See arts. 192, 500/4 (1988), amended by Law n. 356 of Aug. 7, 1992.
157 Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 1, at 458.
158 Id. at 457.
159 Mr. Giovanni Falcone & Mr. Paolo Borsellino.
160 Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 1, at 457.
161 Benjamin Scotti, Rico vs. 416-bis: A Comparison of U.S. and Italian Anti-
Organized Crime Legislation, 25 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 143 (2002).
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The Court of Cassation provided this coherence when it
broadly interpreted the judge's powers to introduce evidence,'62
which the Code had tried to confine within narrow limits.
163
According to the Court, a judge could introduce evidence at any
point in the trial, even when the parties had presented no
evidence,' 64 or before the introduction of the evidence the parties
had requested. 165 The Court ruled this way despite the fact that the
Code was clear in allowing the judge to introduce evidence only
once the parties had presented their cases, and in denying the
judge this power when the parties had not introduced any
evidence.166  After this decision, the judge's power relating to
evidence, which the Code had clearly envisioned as auxiliary to
the parties' powers, became widespread and autonomous. 1
67
C. The 1998 Show-Down
Five years passed before the Parliament decided to reassess the
original accusatorial choice. In 1997, a bill was passed that
reduced the use of investigative evidence in order to restore the
principles of orality and immediacy. 168  The reform included
Article 513/2 and declared that previous statements of a severed
co-defendant were inadmissible if he exercised his privilege
against self-incrimination, as had been the case under the original
162 Cass., sez. un., 6 Nov. 1992, Martin, Cass. Pen. 1993, 280.
163 C.P.P. art. 507 (1988).
164 Cass., sez. un., 6 Nov. 1992, Martin, Cass. Pen. 1993, 280.
165 Cass. sez. 1, 10 Aug. 1995, Caprioli, Giust. Pen. 1994, III, 299.
166 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. The literature opposes this
interpretation. See, e.g., Luca Marafioti, L'art. 507 c.p.p. al vaglio delle Sezioni Unite:
un addio al processo accusatorio e all'imparzialiti del giudice dibattimentale, in
RIVISTA ITALIANA Di DIRTro E PROCEDURA PENALE 829 (1993).
167 Note that the Consitutional Court also agreed with this interpretation of article
507, justifying its decision on the judge's need to search for truth without any limits.
Corte cost., 26 Mar. 1993, n. 11, RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITrO E PROCEDURA PENALE
1062 (1994). The decision can also be read in English in THAMAN, supra note 73, at
174-76. For critical comments on this Consitutional Court decision, see Paolo Ferrua, I
poteri probatori del giudice dibattimentale: ragionevolezza delle Sezioni Unite e
dogmatismo della Corte Costituzionale, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DIRITrO E PROCEDURA
PENALE 1073 (1994); Giorgio Spangher, L'articolo 507 c.p.p. davanti alla Corte
Costituzionale: ulteriore momento nella definizione del "sistema accusatorio"
compatibile con la Costituzione, GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 919 (1993).
168 Law n. 267 of Aug. 7, 1997 (published in Gazz. Uff., No. 186, Aug. 11, 1997).
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draft of the 1988 Code. 169
The reform did indeed move toward a restoration of the
accusatorial system siace it preserved the defendant's right of
confrontation. However, this attempt at reform was quickly
attacked by the Constitutional Court in decision n. 361 of 1998.170
The Court scrutinized the revised provision and concluded that it
was unconstitutional because it violated the principle of
reasonableness entailed in the equality clause)" Again, the Court
justified its decision on the judicial duty of searching for the truth
and repeated that no judicial activities should be wasted or
evidence lost.'72
While decision n. 361 confirmed the return to a mixed-
inquisitorial system, it also displayed new frontiers. An
institutional conflict was now occurring: the new Article 513/2
was passed by Parliament only to have the Court strike it down a
few months after it became effective. Parliament and the judiciary
were clearly on opposite sides in an open conflict, and the
judiciary had prevailed. It became clear that the only way to stop
the trend back to an inquisitorial system was to amend the
Constitution. The only problem with this, though, is a
constitutional reform requires a higher majority in Parliament than
a regular reform (two thirds of the Parliament). 173
IV. Factors Contributing to the Accusatorial System's Failure
A vast number of causes have been proposed to explain the
169 Id. For comments on the Novel, see Stefania Carnevale, Dichiarazioni del
coimputato, diritto di difesa ed esigenze di non dispersione della prova: nuovo assetto di
un difficile equilibrio, in CASSAZIONE PENALE 3636 (1997); Giulio Illuminati, Uno
guardo unitario alle riforne dell'estate 1997, DIRrrrO PENALE E PROCESSO 1519 (1997);
Andrea Scella & Alberto Giannone, Commento alla legge 7 agosto 1997- Modifica delle
disposizioni del codice di procedura penale in tema di valutazione delle prove,
LEGISLAZIONE PENALE 287 (1998).
170 Corte cost., 1998, n. 361, Giur. Cost. 2083 (1998).
171 Id. The argument is that after the reform, the Code permitted the use of previous
statements of a joint co-defendant who had exercised the privilege against self-
incrimination, while it forbade the use of previous statements of the severed co-
defendant who exercised the same privilege. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying
text.
172 Corte cost., 1998, n. 361, Giur. Cost. 2083 (1998).
173 ITALY CONST. art. 138.
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failure of the incorporation of an accusatorial system into Italian
criminal procedure.'74 This Article will only discuss those factors
which are considered the primary causes of the failure: 1) the
cultural factor: the search for "material" truth; 2) contradictions in
the legislature's plan of 1988; 3) the public prosecutor as an
impartial actor; and 4) the professional status of judges. Before
discussing these factors, though, it is necessary to analyze whether
the Constitution required the aforementioned decisions.
A. An Inquisitorial Constitution?
Section III of this Article demonstrates that the main cause of
the failure of the 1988 Code was the Constitutional Court. In all
its decisions, the Court relied on the Constitution and stated that its
conclusions were based on a constitutional background. It is
unclear, however, whether this was an accurate assertion.
Prior to being amended, the Constitution did not impose a
precise model for criminal proceedings, but an adversarial-
accusatorial choice was a better fit for the values it protected.
Article 24, section 2 guarantees the right to an attorney and an
effective defense, and gives the accused the right to be informed as
soon as possible of the charge filed.'75 Article 27, section 2
guarantees the principle of the presumption of innocence, thereby
placing the burden of proof on the prosecution. 176  Article 101,
section 2 (affirming that judges should obey only the law) and
Article 112 (providing a separation of functions between
magistrates who judge and those who prosecute) assure the
impartiality of the judge.'77 In addition, Article 101, section 1 is
relevant because it states that justice should be administered and
given in the name of the Italian people, imposes maximum
transparency in the procedures, and prevents secret proceedings,
all factors typical of an inquisitorial model of criminal justice.178
174 See, e.g., Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants:
Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L., 839, 840-41 (1997);
Grande, supra note 30, at 227-58.
175 ITALY CONST. art. 24, § 2.
176 Id. art. 27, § 2 (stating "the accused is not considered guilty until the irrevocable
decision of guilt").
177 Id. arts. 101, § 2, 112 (stating "the public prosecutor has the duty to start
criminal action").
178 Id. art. 101, § 1.
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The recognition and affirmation of all these rights clearly shows
that an accusatorial-adversarial criminal procedure model was
more in line with the constitutional background. The
Constitutional Court simply failed to see this reality.
B. Cultural Factors: The Search for "Material" Truth.
Cultural factors were the determinate factor limiting the
effectiveness of the new Code. The ideology of the 1988 Code
was the converse of the traditional model of criminal law and
procedure in Italy. The traditional model was premised on the
assumption that an impartial, capable researcher could best
ascertain the facts of a case. By contrast, the new Code is rooted
in the premise that there is not an objective way to ascertain facts
or conclusions, but that truth is best found through confrontation
of differing points of view.
The traditional view of the fact-finding process is still
prevalent today in Italy, both among the judiciary, 79 and among
the public. 80  The following opinion illustrates the cultural
opposition the judiciary has toward the new accusatorial system:
There are two ways to conceive the criminal process, standing
on opposite sides. On one side, the one that conceives the
criminal process as the instrument for ascertaining the historical
truth of the facts; on the other side, the one that conceives the
process as a system to solve a controversy between two parties,
as a competition where the winner is the party who is more
capable, more persuasive, more brilliant.... The essential
problem lies just here: what type of process do we want? That
of the continental tradition, or that of [clommon-law? The
difference is abyssal, because if I choose the second option truth
does not matter anymore.
18 1
179 ALESSANDRO GIULIANI, IL CONCETrO CLASsico Di PROVA 231-53 (1960).
180 On induction in the inquisitorial tradition, see Paulo Ferrua et al., I guidizio
penale: fatto e valore giuridico, in LA PROVA NEL DIBATrIMENTO PENALE 218 (Paolo
Ferrua et al. eds., 1999); Alessandro Giuliani, Prova, in XXXVII ENCICLOPEDIA
GIURIDICA 570 (1988).




C. Contradictions in the Legislature's Plan of 1988
The 1988 Code did contain some weaknesses and deficiencies.
For example, the choice of allowing the judge to introduce his own
evidence, even though in a subsidiary role to the parties, was a
sharp wound to the adversary profile. 8 2 The risk of apathy and
negligence of the parties in accomplishing their duties is relevant
but it should have been cured in ways other than by giving the
judge the chance to introduce evidence. When the judge
introduces evidence, he is transformed into a researcher and loses
his impartiality.'83 In addition to this problem, the provision
collides with the presumption of innocence and the related rule
placing the burden of proof on the prosecution.'84 In short, if the
evidence is lacking to such an extent that the judge cannot make a
decision, he should acquit the accused; the prosecution simply
failed to meet its burden of proof. When a judge instead searches
for evidence, it demonstrates his belief that the defendant is
guilty.185
The 1988 Code also had too many exceptions to the hearsay
rule, particularly in permitting the substantive use at trial of
witness's statement collected at or close to the commission of the
alleged crime, even though this exception only applied after the
statements had been used for impeachment purposes. 8 6  This
exception contradicts the strong intention of the drafters in
creating a solid barrier between investigation and trial. 187  In
addition, the idea that statements given in the excitement of the
moments after the crime are more genuine is far from true. It is
not surprising that in one of its rulings, the Constitutional Court
leaned on these many exceptions to the hearsay rule as
justification for the principle that no evidence should be wasted. 188
The many exceptions to the hearsay rule were the result of an
182 C.P.P. art. 507 (1988).
183 Gilberto Lozzi, II giusto processo e i riti speciali deflativi del dibattimento, in
RIVISTA ITALIANA DI PROCEDEURA PENALE 1163 (2002).
184 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
185 See ILLUMINATI, supra note 97.
186 C.P.P. art. 500/4 (1988).
187 NOBILI, supra note 63, at 20.
188 See supra note 155-56 and accompanying text.
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attempt by the drafters to find a half-measure solution so that the
break with the past would not be too harsh. 189 This compromise
was indeed a weakness of the Code.' 90 When a revolution takes
place, too many compromises can be a step backward. It would
have been better for the drafters to be more courageous and create
a full accusatorial system. Such a decision would probably not
have avoided the ideological battle, but it would have at least
made it more difficult for the inquisitorial faction to prevail.
D. Judicial Organization: The Common Background of
Prosecutors and Judges
While the criminal procedure system in Italy underwent a
major legislative change in 1988, no such innovation occurred
within the judiciary. In Italy, both judges and prosecutors belong
to the judiciary; they are all magistrates and are entitled to the
safeguards that guarantee their independence.' 9 ' Of course, the
two functions of judging and prosecuting are severed, but the
common background is seen as a factor that threatens the
independence and impartiality of the bench and creates an unfair
disadvantage for the defense. 92
Some scholars view this common framework as a reason for
the failure of the accusatorial system.' 93 The common framework
induces the judge to look at the prosecutor as a party without a
personal interest in the case.' 94 The judge views the prosecutor as
a subject pushed by the sole interest of rendering justice and
discovering truth.'95 If the judge is impartial, the prosecutor must
also be impartial since he is selected in the same manner and
189 NOBILI, supra note 63, at 57.
190 Ferrua, supra note 28, at 83-100.
191 Grande, supra note 30, at 236. See David S. Clark, Italian Criminal Justice and
the Rise of an Active Magistracy, 11 DIGEST 1-25 (2003).
192 Giuseppe Di Federico, 1l pubblico ministero: indipendenza, responsabilitli,
carriera separata, in L' INDICE PENALE 399 (1995).
193 Giulio Illuminati, La separazione delle carriere come presupposto per un
riequilibrio dei poteri delle parti, in IL PUBBLICO MINISTERO OGGI 219-20 (1994).
194 Denis Salas, Il giudice, in PROCEDURE PENALI D'EUROPA 458 (Delmas-Marty et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2001).
195 Grande, supra note 30, at 236 (criticizing this view); Langer, supra note 44, at
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enjoys the same guarantees and the same cultural formation as the
judge. 196 If the prosecutor is impartial, his investigation has to be
impartial as well, so the evidence he has collected unilaterally in
his inquiry and placed in the investigative-dossier is just as
credible as the evidence collected in an adversarial trial. 197 In
short, the idea of the prosecutor's impartiality leads to the belief
that all the evidence he has gathered is credible evidence
regardless of how it was collected.
But, if this is true, this means that having judges and
prosecutors in the same category was not the reason for the failure
of the Code's provisions. In fact, the prosecutor can really be
considered impartial only by disregarding the ideology of the
Code, and by disregarding that anyone who is involved in
searching is naturally partial, regardless of his judicial status.' 98
The fact that the prosecutor was conceived as impartial depended
on embracing the old inquisitorial ideology: as long as the
researcher is capable and impartial, he can reach the truth. 199 The
only way for the truth to be found, however, is by the presentation
of two different perspectives at trial in front of a neutral judge.
Another argument raised is that the positioning of the
prosecutor in the judiciary impairs the equal treatment of the
parties. This argument is not convincing. The prosecutor and
defense attorney will always have different powers during the
investigation stage, regardless of whether the prosecutor is placed
in the judicial or the executive branch. If the trial phase is
impermeable to investigations, all that matters is equality of arms
at trial. Under the 1988 Code, the prosecutor did not have greater
powers at trial than the defense attorney did.2° In conclusion, the
common status of magistrate for judges and prosecutors did not
contribute to the accusatorial system's demise.2°'
196 For a description, perhaps a bit ungenerous, of the Italian prosecutor as "the
Achilles' heel of the Italian system," see Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 29-31. For a
description of the prosecutor "as a fourth power," see Grande, supra note 30, at 234-37,
241.
197 Grande, supra note 30, at 236.
198 See CORDERO, supra note 6, at 25.
199 See supra Part II.C.
200 See supra Part II.D.
201 At present, a reform of the judiciary is underway. Although the reform increases
the separation of the functions of prosecutor and judge by providing for different
20051
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E. The Professional Status of Judges
Another aspect of the judicial organization that could have
affected the accusatorial system is the professional status of the
fact-finder. In Italy, except in the Court of Assise, crimes are
judged by a panel of three professional magistrates.2 °2  The
argument is that rules excluding evidence are designed to correct
the problems that arise in a traditional jury system because of
jurors' lack of experience with criminal affairs (e.g., jurors may be
misled by the evidence)." 3 Professional magistrates, on the other
hand, are trained to render justice; they have significant experience
in collecting and evaluating evidence. Therefore, the argument
follows that professionals tend to believe that they do not need
exclusionary rules because they can correctly appreciate the proper
weight and value of each piece of evidence.
The rules of evidence, however, are not necessarily linked with
the jury system, and some influential studies have demonstrated
that the law of evidence is indifferent to the status of the finder of
fact. 204 Exclusionary rules are created to protect the rights of
people, particularly the accused, or to exclude evidence that is not
reliable, regardless of the experience and ability of the judge. The
evidence is inadmissible because it could not lead to a rational
decision. There simply is not any conjunction between the law of
evidence and the profile of the judicial panel, and to admit the
evidence otherwise excluded by the rules would bring no benefit
to the trial proceeding.
Even if Italian judges feel exclusionary rules are a formalistic
exercise conducted in front of magistrates that are experienced and
trained in managing evidence, they still have to apply those rules
as the law provided. Note that while attacking the accusatorial
system in the 1990s, judges could not choose to deny application
of the hearsay rules but rather challenged their constitutional
selection procedures for each, it still does not sever prosecutors from the magistrates'
category.
202 C.P.P. arts. 5,6 (1988).
203 This belief is particularly widespread among common law lawyers. See, e.g.,
MUELLER & KIRKPRATICK, supra note 89, at 2.
204 Alessandro Giuliani, The Influence of Rhetoric on the Law of Evidence and
Pleading, in JUD. REV. 216 (1962); MASSIMO NOBILI, IL PRINCIPIO DEL LIBERO
CONVINCIMENTO DEL GIUDICE 13 (1974).
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validity. 2 5 If the Constitutional Court confirmed the legality of
the accusatorial provisions, the professional judges would have
submitted to those provisions and applied them regularly. In
conclusion, the professional status of judges was not a factor that
led to the derailing of the accusatorial system.
F. Reflections
After analyzing the factors most often cited as leading to the
downfall of the accusatorial system, it seems clear that the
breakdown in the system was almost exclusively due to cultural
factors. The magistrates not only kept thinking in terms of the old
inquisitorial ideology, but they also strongly believed that such
ideology was far better than the new one.2"6 This failure to adapt
to the new ideology was the primary cause for the fall of the
adversarial-accusatorial system.
It is true that the ideological conflict found both pretext and
support in some deficiencies of the 1988 Code.20 7 If the legislature
had been more courageous and taken a more coherent position, the
traditional, inquisitorial ideology would have had a more difficult
time in attacking the accusatorial system. But these deficiencies in
the Code were not the cause of its demise. Rather, they only gave
those against the new ideology a weapon with which they could
launch their attack.
Additionally, it cannot be argued that the accusatorial system
was destroyed because it only imported the law of evidence from
the common law accusatorial system, and did not incorporate other
essential features of the common law system such as the jury
system, inclusion of the prosecutor within the executive branch,
and the principle of prosecutorial discretion in commencing a
criminal proceeding. While it is true that common law countries
have an accusatorial system with the above features, this is simply
a historical reference rather than a definition of an accusatorial
system. In other words, every aspect of the American criminal
justice system is considered accusatorial because it is part of an
accusatorial system, and not because they are necessary elements
205 See supra Part Il1.
206 See supra Part IV.B.
207 See supra Part IV.C.
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of the system.2°8 What makes a system accusatorial is the fact that
evidence is collected in oral form with adversary dynamics in front
of an impartial judge.209 Any other features of the common law
system which surround the adversarial trial are not essential to the
establishment of an accusatorial system.E10
V. The Re-Establishment of the Accusatorial Choice
A. The 1999 Constitutional Reform
As previously discussed, the Constitution did not prohibit an
accusatorial system. 1 ' On the contrary, the Constitution was more
suited to a system based on the parties' initiatives and on evidence
gathered by their cross-examination of the witnesses in front of an
impartial judge.212  Despite this, the counter-attack of the
Constitutional Court (i.e., systematically misinterpreting the
Constitution) made it clear that the battle could not be won
without amending the Constitution and clearly stating the
procedural system that the legislature intended to establish.1 3
Constitutional bill n. 2 of 1999 changed Article 111 of the
Constitution by adding five new sections.214  The reform was
labeled "the fair trial reform," because the added provisions
intended to state the principles of a fair trial that are seen to
correspond with the adversary and accusatorial model.215 In
particular, revised article 111 states that evidence in criminal cases
should only be that which was heard in front of the parties and an
208 It should be pointed out that the majority of scholars consider the patteggiamento
(the type of proceeding which resembles American plea bargaining) as a form of
inquisitorial justice. NAPPI, supra note 46, at 560; Paulo Ferrua, II Nuovo Processo
Penale e la Riforma del Diritto Penale Sostanziale, in STUDI SUL PROCESSO PENALE 30;
FERRAJOLI, supra note 35, at 581 (2000). For the opposing viewpoint, see Paolo Tonini,
I Procedimenti Semplificati, in LE NuOVE DIsPOSIZIONI SUL PROCESSO PENALE 105-11
(Cedam ed., 1989). For a conception of plea-bargaining as a form of inquisitorial justice
in the American literature, see Van Cleave, supra note 112.
209 See supra Part II.B.
210 See FERRAJOLI, supra note 35, at 574-75.
211 See supra Part IV.A.
212 Id.
213 See supra Part III.C.




impartial judge.2 16 This assures the central position of the trial in
criminal proceedings by imposing the respect of the principles of
orality and of immediacy in the collection of evidence.
The reformed Constitution also provides the only legitimate
exceptions to the substantive use of evidence collected outside of
the trial: when the parties agree, when illicit conduct of the witness
is proven, and when it is unavoidable and impossible to collect the
evidence at trial.217  In addition, the reformed Constitution
introduces a confrontation clause, providing that guilt cannot be
proven based upon declarations of an accuser who has always
willingly escaped examination by the accused or his lawyer.218
Also, the adversarial pillar of the accusatorial building is
codified. Section 3 of the revised article 111 grants the defendant
the right to present evidence at trial under the same conditions of
the prosecution and the right to examine directly all declarants21 9.
B. The Reform Following the Enactment of the Constitutional
Reform
The reformed constitutional provision only states general rules
and principles. In order to apply these rules and principles, laws
must be enacted. In 2001, the legislature finally passed a bill that
transferred the new constitutional rights into the Code.
The first rule that was re-established was the "golden rule" of
any accusatorial system:221 prior statements are available only for
undermining the witness' credibility; they cannot be used to prove
the facts they assert.222 The only exceptions to this "golden rule"
are: when the examination of the witness is impossible for
216 ITALY CONST. art. 11, § 4. These are the features of the principle of
"contraddittorio per la prova," which entails the essence of the accusatorial spirit.
217 Id. art. 111, § 5.
218 Id. art. 111,§4.
219 Id. art. 111 § 3. This provision also grants the defendant the right to an
interpreter in case he doesn't speak the Italian language, the right to be informed with the
minimum delay of time possible of the investigations against her, the right to discovery
and to be given enough time to prepare her case. Id.
220 Law n. 63 of Mar. 1, 2001.
221 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
222 C.p.P. art. 500/2 (1988), amended by Law n. 63 of 2001.
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objective reasons independent of the parties' will,223 when the
witness was threatened or corrupted,224 and when both parties
agree. 22' The legislature also reintroduced a sustaining pillar of
the accusatorial system: 226 the ban on police officer testimony
regarding statements collected during investigations. 2 7
The rules on "accomplice evidence" were also partially
rewritten. This time, though, article 513 was not the center of
attention.228 Instead of focusing on the rules for use of prior
statements, the legislature focused on the co-defendant's right to
remain silent. The legislature felt all the difficulties had arisen
because of the broad right of silence granted to the co-defendant;
the co-defendant could accuse others and then later refuse to
respond in court.229 The legislature felt that permitting the use of
prior statements of a co-defendant when he refuses to testify is an
inquisitorial practice that should not be allowed by the system.230
On the other hand, an attempt by a party (the prosecution, in
particular) to use the prior statements for the truth of the matter
asserted depended on the fact that it was frequent in Italy for the
co-defendant to remain silent after having accused somebody.
Therefore, it was necessary to prevent the co-defendant from
remaining silent and exercising such influence on the process.
The legislature's response to this dilemma was to make the co-
defendant assume the position of a witness once he gives the prior
statements accusing the defendant; therefore, he can be compelled
to take the stand at any time to repeat what he said.23' This
223 C.P.P. art. 512 (1988), amended by Law n. 63 of 2001.
224 C.P.P. art. 500/4 (1988), amended by Law n. 63 of 2001.
225 C.P.P. art. 500/7 (1988), amended by Law n. 63 of 2001.
226 See F. Caprioli, Palingenesi di un divieto probatorio. La testimonianza indiretta
nel funzionario di polizia nel rinnovato assetto processuale, in IL GIUSTO PROCESSO TRA
CONTRADDITTORIO E DIRITrO AL SILENZIO 59 (Kostoris ed., 2002).
227 C.P.P. art. 195/4 (1988), amended by Law n. 63 of 2001.
228 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
229 Vittorio Grevi, Processo Penale, <<giusto processo>> e revisione
constituzionale, CASSAZIONE PENALE 3321 (1999); Ennio Amodio, Giusto processo,
diritto al silenzio e obbligo di veriti dell' imputato sul fatto altrui, CASSAZIONE PENALE
3589 (2001).
230 Paolo Ferrua, L'avvenire del contraddittorio, in CRITICA DEL DIRTo 27 (2000).
231 C.P.P. arts. 64 § 3c, 197 § lb (1988). The law expressly provides that the
accomplice becomes a witness only in relation to and to the extent of the declarations
[Vol. 30
REFORMS AND COUNTER-REFORMS
innovation has been strongly criticized because it substantially
undermines the privilege against self-incrimination by forcing a
ro-drlf~ndnnt tn restnond to issues concerning a crime with which
he is charged.232 This waiver of the privilege does not apply to co-
defendants who are accomplices.233 If someone accuses his
accomplice, he will not waive his privilege and become a
witness.234 The reason for this exception is the highly intense
connection of the positions of the accuser and of the accused; with
accomplices, the connection is such that it would be impossible to
speak of one's culpability without speaking of the other at the
same time.
The co-defendant's prior statements can be used substantively
without his oral testimony only when it is impossible to have the
co-defendant be present at trial.235 Note that the prior statements
of an individual defendant can be substantively used if he does not
come to court or exercises the privilege against self-
236incrimination, or if they have been used to attack his credibility
at trial.237
The legislature focused particularly on enacting the
defendant's right to confrontation introduced by the new
Constitution. The Code now provides that a decision cannot be
based on evidence from a witness who has willingly escaped
rendered. C.P.P. art. 64 § 3c. Therefore, an accomplice can still exercise his privilege if
asked about other circumstances. The reason for such a limitation is the fear that a full
duty of testifying on any relevant detail could lead the co-defendant to self-
incrimination. The resulting bizarre situation is that the co-defendant who has accused
somebody can legitimately be questioned on what he previously said, though he cannot
really be cross-examined. The cross-examiner, in fact, cannot ask the co-defendant
anything different from what he said in the first place.
232 See Giulio illuminati, L'imputato che diventa testimone, in L' INDICE PENALE
391 (Alessio Lanzi ed., 2002); OLIVIERO MAZZA, L'INTERROGATORIO E L'ESAME
DELL'IMPUTATO NEL SUO PROCEDIMENTO 322 (2004). Other critics have been moved with
regard to the discipline's complication. See Massimo Nobili, Giusto processo e indagini
difensive, in DIRITTO PENALE E PROCESSO 6 (2001).
233 C.P.P. art. 197, § la; see Gilberto Lozzi, La realtz del processo penale ovvero il
"modello perduto, "in QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA 1106 (2001).
234 C.P.P. arts. 197, § la, 210, amended by Law n. 63 of 2001.
235 Art. 513/2 (1988), amended by Law n. 63 of 2001.
236 C.P.P. art 513/1 (1988), amended by Law n. 63 of 2001.
237 C.P.P. art 503/5 (1988), amended by Law n. 63 of 2001.
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confrontation. 238  Therefore, the out-of-court statements of a
witness who fails to attend the trial cannot be used to prove the
issue of guilt. The exclusionary rule linked to the right of
confrontation also applies to trial in situations where the witness
accuses the defendant during the prosecutor's examination but
remains silent in the defense attorney's cross-examination.239 The
latter provision has been criticized because it undermines the
principle that all trial statements are proper grounds for decision.24
The argument is that statements given in trial are still collected
with respect to the orality and immediacy principles; the evidence
is formed in front of the judge who can decide on its reliability and
on its probative weight.24' If the witness present at trial escapes
cross-examination, his silence affects his credibility, not the
admissibility of evidence. Other scholars defend the provision
with the argument that accusatorial evidence is not simply
evidence produced at trial, but also evidence that respects the
confrontation clause.242
Note that the Italian confrontation clause is different from the
classic confrontation clause such as that imposed by article 6 of
the European Convention of Human Rights243 to which Italy is a
party. The Italian confrontation clause does not directly provide
that the statements of an accuser cannot be proper grounds for a
conviction if the defendant did not have a right to cross-examine
the accuser, as does article 6.2' The Italian confrontation clause
only states that if the accuser avoids cross-examination, no
statements of his may be used in determining guilt.245  In other
238 C.P.P. art 526/1 bis (1988), amended by Law n. 63 of 2001.
239 C.P.P. art 500/3 (1988), amended by Law n. 63 of 2001.
240 See Ferrua, supra note 80, at 17.
241 Id.
242 See Carlotta Conti, Le due anime del contraddittorio nel nuovo art. 111 Cost.,
DIRITrO PENALE E PROCESSO 197 (2000); Carlotta Conti, Giusto processo (diritto
processuale penale), in AGGIORNAMENTO V, ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DuRTro 633 (Angelo
Falzea ed., 2001); Paolo Tonini, 11 contraddittorio diritto individuale e metodo
d'accertamento, DIRITTO PENALE E PROCESSO 1388 (2000).
243 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
6, Nov. 4, 1950, T.S. Nos. 5, 9, 44, 45, 46, 55, 114, 117, 118, 140, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf.
244 Id.
245 See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
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words, instead of focusing on the defendant's right to
confrontation, the Italian clause tends to punish the negligent
accuser. This is why the Italian confrontation clause does not
apply when out-of-court statements are introduced because of the
impossibility of gathering the evidence from the accuser. For
example, if the accuser suddenly dies because of a heart attack, he
has not willingly escaped confrontation and his previous
statements can be grounds for a defendant's conviction.246
C. The Constitutional Court's Assent to the New Provisions
Some of the articles of the recently amended Code have
already been submitted for Constitutional Court scrutiny, but this
time the results have been far different. First, decision n. 439 of
2000 confirmed that the separation between the investigative and
the trial phase is now protected by the Constitution by refusing to
admit prior statements of a witness exercising his parental
privilege at trial. 247  Any remaining doubts as to the successful
return to the accusatorial-adversarial system were then swept away
by decisions n. 32 and n. 36 of 2002.248 In the first decision, the
Court upheld the prohibition against admitting statements
collected by police officers during the investigation as
constitutional.249 In the second decision, by confirming the
constitutionality of the provision that permits the use of prior
statements only for attacking the credibility of the witness, the
constitutional judges finally certified the existence of a solid
barrier between the investigation and the trial.25°
246 This situation could result in Italy receiving a conviction from the European
Court of Human Rights, whose duty is to enforce the Convention. Claudia Cesari, Prova
irripetibile e contraddittorio nella Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo, in RIVISTA
ITALIANA DI DIRITO E PROCEDURA PENALE 1456 (2003). For a discussion about the
relationship between unavailability of the declarant and the confrontation clause under
the new discipline, see Michele Panzavolta, Le letture di atti irripetibili al bivio tra
"impossibiliti oggettiva" e "libera scelta, " in CASSAZIONE PENALE 3974 (2003).
247 Corte cost., 2000, n. 439, DIRiTro PEN. E PROCESSO 1472 (2000).
248 Corte cost., 2002, 32, Cass. Pen. 1932 (2002). Corte cost., 2002, 36, Cass. Pen.
1936 (2002).
249 Corte cost., 2002, n. 32.
250 Corte cost., 2002, n. 36. Some decisions have also confirmed constitutional
compliance of the new discipline regarding co-defendant's evidence. See, e.g., Corte
cost., 2002, n. 291, Dir. Pen. E processo 1213 (2001).
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D. Present Disputes Within the Accusatorial System
Italian scholars have generally approved of the re-
establishment of the accusatorial system of criminal procedure.25'
Despite this general approval, some differences of opinion remain
particularly concerning the exceptions to the rule of the
inadmissibility of out-of-court statements.
The main dispute centers around the possibility, allowed by the
Code and the Constitution, of admitting prior statements when it is
impossible to collect the evidence orally during trial because the
witness is unavailable (e.g., when the witness has suddenly died).
Some scholars say that there is no reason for this exception.252
The simple fact that there is no chance to gather the evidence
during trial does not increase the reliability of the out-of-court
statements; if the chance is lost to gain the evidence in the proper
manner, that does not mean that what was once improper evidence
should now be deemed trustworthy. 213 It is for these reasons that
some scholars have proposed to ban the substantive use of such
investigative evidence and to limit its use to attacking witness'
credibility.
In response to this argument, it is stated that the substantive
use of prior statements because of the impossibility of taking the
witness' deposition during trial is a realistic and necessary
exception in a slow criminal system such as Italy's. Trials are
normally commenced many years after the alleged crime and, due
to the passing of time, the sources of evidence might naturally
disappear (e.g., the witness dies) or lose their potential for
providing relevant information (e.g., the witness simply cannot
remember). 4  The argument is that without these evidentiary
exceptions, almost all Italian trials would end with acquittals.
251 Ennio Amodio, 1l processo penale tra disgregazione e recupero del sistema, in
VERSO LA RISCOPERTA DI UN MODELLO PROCESSUALE 36-37 (2003). Daniele Vicoli, Le
"res gestae": un'ipotesi di recupero in chiave probatoria alla luce della legge di
attuazione sul giusto processo, in VERSO LA RISCOPERTA DI UN MODELLO PROCESSUALE
183 (2003).
252 Giostra, supra note 43, at 61; Giulio Ubertis, Prova e contraddittorio, in VERSO
LA RISCOPERTA DI UN MODELLO PROCESSUALE 201(2003).
253 Giostra, supra note 43, at 61; Ubertis, supra note 252, at 201.
254 See infra note and accompanying text.
255 Some scholars also affirm that the impossibility of repeating evidence at trial is a
logical limit to the application of the rule against hearsay: NAPPI, supra note 46, at 23.
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Another controversial point involves the provision that permits
the substantive use of out-of-court statements when there has been
criminal conduct against the witness (e.g. the witness was
threatened).256 The controversy centers around who should be the
source of the criminal conduct. Some believe that in order to
allow the substantive use of these prior statements, the illicit
wrongdoing on the witness should be committed by one of the
parties.251 Others argue that it does not matter who exerted the
criminal pressure on the witness, so long as there is clear evidence
of it.2
58
An additional controversial point involves the constitutional
provision that permits the substantive use of out-of-court
statements with the defendant's consent. 25 9  Literally read, the
provision only requires the consent of the defendant.26 ° Such a
view would clearly violate equality of arms between the defendant
and the prosecutor. The defendant could take advantage of all out-
of-court statements and records he wishes to invoke, while the
prosecution would be strictly limited to trial evidence. Some
scholars propose to interpret the provision as though it implicitly
referred to a prosecutor's request to use some out-of-court
statements for substantive purposes. Others suggest that the
defendant's consent can be given only for investigative evidence
collected by the prosecutor.26'
The legislature has enacted the Constitution by providing that
a bilateral consensus is necessary for use of out-of-court
statements. Even this rule, however, raises a significant debate.
Some say that this consensual approach is a denial of a fair trial
because the trial is no longer a search for truth but is purely a
game. Accusatorial procedure is based on the belief that some
evidence is improper evidence which, if considered in the
decisionmaking, leads to a wrongful judgment. When the parties
256 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
257 Conti, supra note 242, at 633.
258 See S. Corbetta, Principio del contraddittorio e disciplina delle contestazioni
nell'esame dibattimentale, in GIUSTO PROCESSO. NUOVE NORME SULLA FORMAZIONE E
VALUTAIONE DELLA PROVA 482 (Tonini ed., 2001); Ferrua, supra note 80, at 18-2 1.
259 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
260 Id.
261 Giostra, supra note 43, at 60.
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agree to admit evidence that is not reliable, such as evidence
collected unilaterally out-of-court, they permit the judge to base
his decision on this dangerous material only for the purpose of
winning the case.262 If the accusatorial system is the best way to
ascertain the truth of facts, bargains on proof should not be
permitted.
Other scholars feel that the bilateral consensus requirement to
admit out-of-court evidence does not contradict the accusatorial
goals. In fact, by agreeing on the admission of evidence, the
parties show that they have no interest in reproducing such
evidence at trial since they believe they would not gain any better
result. In other words, the parties implicitly assume that the
deposition at trial would be no different than what the previous
statement asserts.263 This conception of the consensus requirement
sweeps away the fear of loss of the cognitive character of the trial.
The aforementioned debate on the role that a consensus on
evidence should have is heightened by the differences between the
new system and the traditional view. According to the latter, none
of the rights involved in a criminal trial can be subjected to waiver
or other disposition.Z64 In addition, the debate is fueled by
opposite points of view for criminal trials. On one side, there is
the idea that trial should be completely left to the responsibility of
the parties.265 On the other side, there is the fear that giving the
parties more freedom in the ascertainment of the facts might give
rise to inequalities. For example, poor defendants with inadequate
attorneys might be more easily forced to waive their trial rights.
E. Is the Accusatorial System Sustainable? A Difficult
Harmonization with Efficiency and the Resurrection of
Inquisitorial Procedures Within the Accusatorial System
Now that the accusatorial spirit is on its way to being fully
established, the new frontier is that of harmonizing the Italian
262 Id.
263 Glauco Giostra, Analisi e prospettive di un modello probatorio incompiuto, in
QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA 1135-38 (2001).
264 MARIA LUCIA DI BITONTO, PROFmLI DISPOsITIVi DELL'ACCERTAMENTO PENALE
73-92 (2004).
265 See ENNIO AMODIO, Processo penale diritto europeo e common law. Dal rito
inquisitorio al giusto processo 139 (2003).
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system with the goal of efficiency. 266 In fact, inefficiency causes a
spiral of great malfunction. The more trials that take place many
years after the alleged crime, the more defendants are willing to
face trial and avoid alternative proceedings. 267 A trial commenced
long after the alleged crime will be less likely to fully ascertain the
facts, and will more likely result in an acquittal.268 Moreover,
since Italian legislation provides for statutes of limitation, the
longer it takes to get to trial, the greater the chances the accused
has in being able to take advantage of these limitations.269
Inefficiency produces a vicious cycle: as more defendants opt for
trial, more trials result, and it takes longer and longer for each trial
270to commence.
The enormous caseload of the Italian system itself adds to this
cycle of inefficiency. Various reforms have recently been adopted
to cope with this backlog.271 One reform issued in 1998 provided
that minor crimes be judged by a single judge rather than by the
traditional panel of three magistrates.272 In 2001, the legislature
also introduced justices of the peace to deal with petty offenses,
thereby relieving the tribunals from deciding some cases.273
Despite these reforms, there is still tremendous pressure on the
system to be more efficient. It is essential that this pressure be
alleviated in order to assure that the accusatorial system will be




270 The average length of a criminal case is not encouraging. The case sits 347 days
in the prosecution office. Then, once the charge is filed, the preliminary hearing (when it
is provided) takes another 324 days. Relation of the chief public prosecutor of the court
of cassation on the state of the Italian justice in the year 2004, available at
http://www.giustizia.it/uffici/inaug_ag/cass2005index.htm#ral7. The trial in front of the
tribunal takes 377 days (398 days for the trial in front of the court of assise). Id. Finally,
only 606 days are needed for the appeal (203 when the appeal is in front of the court of
assise of appeal). Id.
271 For a comparison of the Italian and the American attempts to cope with their
judicial backlogs, see Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 7, at 15-26.
272 Decree n. 51 of Feb. 19, 1998 (published in Gazz. Uff., No. 66 (Mar. 20, 1988)).
273 Decree n. 274 of Aug. 28, 2000 (published in Gazz. Uff., No. 234 (Oct. 6,
2000)). On this subject see MICHELE CAIANIELLO, POTERI DEI PRIVATI NELL'ESERCIZIO
DELL'AZIONE PENALE 149-223 (2003); IL GIUDICE DI PACE NELLA GIURISDIZIONE
PENALE 3 (Glauco Giostra - Giulio Illuminati eds., 2001).
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sustainable in the long run. In order to address this concern, the
legislature has pushed the idea of increasing the applicability of
alternative proceedings.
In December 1999, just a few months after the Constitution
had been amended, bill n. 479 introduced major changes in the
abbreviated trial.2 74  The bilateral agreement necessary in the
original version to access this alternative proceeding2 75 was
replaced by the unilateral will of the defendant.276 Now the
defendant can ask to be judged on the investigative-file and the
prosecutor can only observe, having lost any veto power.2 77 The
defendant can now also raise a different type of request for
abbreviated trial where, along with the demand for a judgment on
the investigative evidence, he can also ask for the introduction of
new evidence during the hearing. 278 The judge must accept the
demand for a judgment on the investigative evidence, but he can
reject the demand for the introduction of new evidence if the
evidence requested is not necessary or if the assumption of
evidence would cause a significant loss of time.279
There is no doubt that the new structure of the abbreviated trial
was created to widen its range of application and relieve the
current burden of trials. The reform has been strongly criticized,
though.28 ° Since any defendant who chooses this inquisitorial
form of procedure is guaranteed a reduction of any penalty by one-
third,281 the system clearly creates an incentive for defendants to
choose the inquisitorial form of criminal procedure over the
accusatorial one. In short, the system seems to favor the
inquisitorial form of criminal procedure in the name of greater
274 Law n. 479 of Dec. 16, 1999 (called "Legge Carotti") (published in Gazz. Uff.,
No. 296 (Dec. 18, 1999)).
275 See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
276 C.P.P., art. 438 (1988), amended by Law n. 479, art. 27. An English version of
this article can be found in THAMAN, supra note 73, at 243-4.
277 C.P.P., art. 438, § 5 (1988), amended by Law n. 479, art. 27.
278 Id.
279 Id. After all, if the assumption of evidence takes a lot of time this would deny
the abbreviated feature of this type of proceedings and any form of procedural economy
would disappear.
280 Lozzi, supra note 233, at 1099-1100.




In 2001, in a further attempt to reduce the pressure on the
Italian trial system, the legislature enlarged the application of the
patteggiamento, permitting the prosecutor and defendant to agree
on a penalty of up to five years in prison.282 The penalty the
parties agree on is reduced by one third, so the parties can reach a
deal for crimes punishable by up to seven and a half years in
prison and, if some mitigating circumstances apply, for crimes
punishable up to eleven years in prison.283
The legislature has tried to increase special proceedings, a path
that corresponds to the original intentions of the 1988 Code.2 4
Despite these legislative improvements, statistics show
disheartening results. The patteggiamento covers about 15 percent
of all sentences pronounced by tribunals and the abbreviated trial
covers only 10 percent of the proceedings not dismissed.285
Many Italian scholars do not agree with this legislative trend.
They believe that it reintroduces the inquisitorial style of criminal
procedure from which Italy wanted to depart.286 This criticism of
the alternative proceedings as a hidden inquisitorial system dates
back to the origin of the Code.287  The criticism of the present
expansion of the special proceedings is based on the right belief
that having an accusatorial trial does not suffice to make a system
accusatorial. Not only does the potential for an accusatorial trial
need to be guaranteed, but also the effectiveness. After all,
alternative proceedings such as the abbreviated trial alone should
not play a more important role than the accusatorial trial in solving
criminal cases. If more processes are handled in an inquisitorial
282 C.P.P. art. 444 (1988), amended by Law n. 134 of June 12, 2003 (published in
Gazz. Uff., No. 136 (June 14, 2003)). For two different justifications (and a third
hidden, political justification) of the increase of patteggiamento, see Langer, supra note
44, at 49 n. 236.
283 C.P.P. art. 444 (1988), amended by Law n. 134.
284 See supra Part II.F.
285 Lozzi, supra note 183, at 1159.
286 Gilberto Lozzi, It giudizio abbreviato, in RIVISTA ITALIANA Di DfRITrO E
PROCEDURA PENALE 465 (2000).
287 FERRAJOLI, supra note 35, at 777; Luigi Ferrajoli, Patteggiamenti e crisi della
giurisdizione, QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA 371 (1989); Paolo Ferrua, II nuovo processo penale
e la riforma nel diritto penale sostanziale, in STUDI SUL PROCESSO PENALE I 13-43 (Paolo
Ferrua et al. eds., 1992).
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way, then the accusatorial system is rendered essentially
inquisitorial. Since it is widely known that the Italian system can
ill afford to have additional trials, critics of the expansion of
alternative proceedings feel that the better way to reduce the
caseload is to reduce the number of punishable crimes and allow
the prosecutor to screen out all facts of minor relevance at the
commencement of proceedings.288
VI. Conclusion
In recent years, new legislative developments have set aside
the re-establishment of an accusatorial system and have instead
focused on different and disputable reforms whose effect on the
system is yet to be understood. 289 The hope is that the legislature
will soon retreat from solutions of this type and focus more on its
attempt to concretely affirm the accusatorial conquest over the
inquisitorial system.
If the accusatorial system is on its way to being re-established
in Italy, 290 its most pressing challenges can be seen already.
Should the legislature rely more and more on alternative
proceedings or should it try to grant everybody a full trial,
reducing the number of punishable crimes and introducing a
prosecutorial screen? Regardless of the measures chosen, a
mandatory step must be to eliminate the judge's power to
introduce evidence. This is not only necessary for a full
affirmation of the adversarial-accusatorial system, but this
innovation would also impose on the parties a higher degree of
effort and attention. It is essential that the judge sit in a neutral
and impartial position. In addition, the legislature must assure
consistency throughout the system; reform after reform has
resulted in a Code lacking in essential coherence. The Code has a
strange impressionistic dimension: one understands its inclination
288 See generally DiRirro PENALE MINIMO (U. Curi & G. Palombarini eds., 2000).
289 Two other reforms should be mentioned. One deals with the shift in the venue of
the trial because of the fear of a biased judge. See Law n. 248 of Nov. 7, 2002
(published in Gazz. Uff., No. 261 (Nov. 7, 2002), amending C.P.P. arts. 45, 47, 48, 49
(1988). The other deals with judicial cooperation with foreign authorities. See Law n.
367 of Oct. 5, 2001 (published in Gazz. Uff., No. 234 (Oct. 8, 2001)). Both reforms
seemed to be more concentrated on the course of a few specific trials involving
important politicians than on the benefit of the whole criminal system, though.
290 For an argument that it is not, see Lozzi, supra note 233, at 1112.
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for an accusatorial trial and its efforts to exclude evidence
collected out-of-court, but when it comes to solving a specific
matter, the Code offers hundreds of possible solutions that
reflected a more inquisitorial manner. The courts' and scholars'
efforts are presently aimed at assuring a minimum level of
coherence to the procedures, but the situation is far from being
stabilized.29'
Some argue that the new frontier of the legislature is that of
pragmatism. 292  It moves without attention to the judicial
categories and instead focuses on achieving straightforward results
in the practice of handling criminal cases.293 If this is so, the duty
of jurists must be to prevent this pragmatism from endangering the
accusatorial system's stability. An accusatorial system that does
not work, because of its inefficiency or because of a lack of
coherence, is not accusatorial in the first place.
291 See, e.g., Claudia Cesari, "Giusto processo," contraddittorio ed irripetibilita
degli atti di indagine, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DiRiTro E PROCEDURA PENALE 62 (2001)
(writing on the impossibility of oral gathering of evidence); Panzavolta, supra note 246
(same); Giulio Illuminati, La testimonianza della polizia giudiziaria sul contenuto di
dichiarazioni non verbalizzate, in CASSAZIONE PENALE 660 (2003) (writing on police
hearsay).




624 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 30
